A CGD note. “Two Futures” presents two scenarios—a reasonable best- and worst-case version of the world in 2050 based on the culmination of a wide-ranging CGD research project that forecasts demographic and education trends, sectoral change and the decline of global manufacturing jobs, climate change impacts, and the changing face of development finance and aid—and examines the policy choices that might take us to each of them.
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A CGD Working Paper. The World Bank’s extreme poverty line has been a huge marketing success, motivating widespread discussion of global poverty. At the same time, it has growing weaknesses. For measuring progress, we want a fixed-definition indicator. The extreme poverty line is not that. For measuring or guaranteeing access of a basic bundle of “economic goods and services” we want to measure (potential) access to those services. The extreme poverty line doesn’t do that. For targeting assistance, we want an indicator that influences distribution. The extreme poverty line has largely been ignored in that regard. A multidimensional indicator tied to the Sustainable Development Goals might be a worthy replacement. I discussed the paper with VoxDev.
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A CGD Working Paper with George Yang. This paper explores the potential implications of a declining absolute labor force on economic outcomes. It explores key macroeconomic variables during periods of negative and positive prime age (15-65) population growth (PAPG). These variables include 10-year bond yields, consumer price indices, female labor force participation, GDP, government expenditures, government revenue, and stock returns. We find effects may include lower economic growth, declining government revenues, flat or declining labor force participation, and lower investment returns. As negative PAPG is spreading worldwide, this portends a less favorable economic outlook.
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A brief for Cato's Defending Globalization series: global connections are the only way to a high income low carbon world.
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On March 21, 2024, I gave testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, the Border, and Foreign Affairs of the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability at a hearing titled “Accountable Assistance: Reviewing Controls to Prevent Mismanagement of Foreign Aid.” Luckily, I didn't get too many questions.
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A CGD note. An increasing proportion of official development assistance (ODA) is being dedicated to climate, and climate mitigation in particular. Even were that spending highly effective, and despite reaching about $30 billion in 2020, it is not large enough to finance investment that would significantly slow global climate change. But were it effective, 20 years of mitigation finance should have been significant enough to at least bend the curve on emissions in countries receiving large amounts relative to their GNI. Sadly, existing project-level and country-level evidence suggests that, in terms of carbon dioxide abated per dollar of spending, mitigation finance is a considerable distance from being highly effective. That only adds to concerns that the net costs to the world’s poorest countries of diverting development ODA to mitigation may be large. In this note I look at existing evidence and provide additional analysis to suggest past mitigation finance may have had little impact on emissions.
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A CGD note. Marginal abatement cost curves, which suggest the cheapest approaches to reducing carbon emissions, are out of favor in international climate finance discussions because they are not good tools to use when thinking about systemic and urgent change. On the other hand, international
financing studies based on adding up the investment requirements linked to an emissions path to 1.5 degrees of warming produce historically implausible numbers and endanger existing development finance. To close the gap, we need to push the cost curve down (through technology
advance) and lower the price of finance (through scalable multilateral development bank support) while protecting development finance and focusing it on where it is most needed: the poorest countries suffering the most from climate change. -
A working paper for CGD with Eeshani Kapandal and Brian Webster. Research highlights the gains to the quality of policymaking from diversifying the body of policymakers. International financial institutions (IFIs) appear to agree, all issuing diversity, equity, and inclusion statements. But how do these institutions perform when it comes to their own staff—do they lead by example? We put together a unique dataset of 20 years of HR staffing data from seven major IFIs that are collectively responsible for more than a quarter trillion dollars of lending and employed 33,775 individuals in 2022. The picture is quite mixed: on the one hand, the share of women in any management position has almost doubled over the past two decades, from 20 percent in the year 2000 to just under 40 percent in 2023. The share of women in senior management (observed for a subset of 5 IFIs) grew from around 5 percent to around 30 percent in the same period. On the other hand, not one IFI has achieved gender parity across managerial ranks. Women make up almost 70 percent of the administrative support grades, but only about 35 percent of managerial grades. Senior management positions are less diverse again, with the proportion ranging from six percent to about forty percent. When it comes to boards (appointed by shareholders rather than by the institutions themselves) the situation is even worse: fewer than one in five IFI board members are women. In the professional ranks, many IFIs are close to or even beyond parity, but men are still disproportionately likely to make it out of professional ranks into the managerial ones.
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A speech at the Oxford Martin School. Richer countries are rapidly ageing and productivity is stagnating. Meanwhile, industry – the motor for rapid economic development in the past – employs ever fewer people worldwide. And yet there is still hope for greater, and shared, global prosperity. Declining working age populations in rich countries are demanding ever-more services. A rising, increasingly educated working age population in lower income economies can provide them. This is an immense, mutually beneficial opportunity to create a new development model, and a new model for development assistance. Aid for economic growth traditionally tried to foster the expansion of export-oriented industrial employment in recipient countries through physical investment. In the future, it can foster the expansion of expatriate employment through skills partnerships.
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A CGD Working Paper with Zack Gehan. In absolute dollar amounts official development assistance (ODA) reached an all-time high in 2021. But as a percentage of recipient country GDP, aid (and broader public investment) flows have been declining for some time. This paper looks at the scale of ODA and official financial flows (including multilateral flows) in comparison to donor and recipient GDP, and suggests some scenarios for the range of flows going forward, as well as examining the potential share of resources taken by climate finance. It concludes that there is a non-trivial chance that ODA for non-humanitarian and climate finance falls in absolute terms over the coming years and that aid becomes increasingly focused on richer countries. In terms of increasing aid available, the most promising strategy for bilateral ODA flows may be to increase the generosity of traditional donors but for broader finance for international development, and particularly multilateral finance, increasing the range of donors may have a larger payoff. This will be necessary, because demand for multilateral finance is likely to rise.
Charles Kenny 